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Abstract 
This paper analyses the relationship between market discipline and bank charter value using a panel 
dataset of publicly-listed domestic banks in Australia and Canada over the 1995–2011 periods, with 
particular focus on the 2007/2008 global financial crisis (GFC). Overall, our results show a positive 
relationship between market discipline and bank charter value, although this has reduced in the post-GFC 
period. Furthermore, our findings reveal that in the presence of market discipline, bank capital, 
contingent liabilities, and non-interest income are important sources of charter value. These findings have 
important policy implications related to bank safety and soundness. The results are robust to model 
specification. 
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1. Introduction 
This study investigates the relationship between market discipline and bank charter value1  
for publicly listed domestic banks in Australia and Canada during the 1995-2011 periods. We 
particularly examine whether the link between these factors is impacted by specific characteristics 
such as regulatory capital strength, exposure to contingent liabilities and non-traditional 
intermediation activities. We question whether such bank-specific characteristics affect bank 
charter value particularly in the presence of market discipline. Specifically, we explore this issue 
during the 2007/2008 global financial crisis (GFC). 
We evaluate the unique settings of Australian and Canadian banks because they 
demonstrated extra-ordinary resilience during the global credit turmoil that started in mid-2007. 
Australia and Canada share an important feature: these countries’ banks have avoided being 
identified as among the world's systemically important banks, a status that would have carried 
additional regulatory scrutiny. Despite the GFC, Australian and Canadian banks continue to be 
profitable and well-capitalized. Attributes that helped the financial systems of these countries to 
weather the storm include well-regulated mortgage markets, strong domestic deposit bases to 
support lending, less reliance on foreign liabilities, limited shadow banking sectors, prohibition of 
mergers among major domestic or foreign banks, and active and sound supervisory regimes with 
close co-operation among authorities (International Monetary Fund, 2013). Further, the Basel III 
framework incorporates many of the advantages of the Canadian banking system, including the 
leverage ratio and substantially higher quantity, quality and transparency of Tier 1 capital, among 
others. 
Banks have incentives to take ‘excessive’ risk at the expense of tax-payers funds and 
creditors because of the well-known ‘moral hazard’ problem emanating from limited liability and 
mispriced deposit insurance premium (Merton, 1977). This is compounded by the ‘too-big-to-
                                                          
1 Risk-taking incentives of banks depend on their values charter, which reflect future economic rents that banks obtain from 
privileged access to markets protected from competition (Goyal, 2005). Banks thus have fewer incentives to engage in risk taking 
activities, because if they fail, they lose their valuable charters (Keeley, 1990).  
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fail’ effect with large banks. Risk-taking incentives are however tempered if banks have 
something to lose in case of failure, such as their franchise or charter value (Demsetz, Saidenberg 
and Strahan, 1996). The disciplining role of the charter value was first pointed out by Marcus 
(1984), who argues that increased competition in the bank industry erodes banks’ charter values, 
thus increasing incentives for excessive risk-taking. Similarly, Keeley (1990) has shown that in the 
pre-deregulation era (prior to the 1980s) the fear of losing their franchise (entry barriers in 
banking) compensated for banks' risk-taking incentives due to underpriced deposit insurance.  
In recent years, with higher competition in banking and consequently a lower disciplinary 
role for charter value, considerable attention has been paid to market discipline. Market 
discipline is defined as a market-based mechanism in which investors in bank liabilities such as 
uninsured depositors penalize banks for taking excessive risk by requiring higher interest rates or 
withdrawing their deposits (Martinez-Peria and Schmukler, 2001). These market-based 
disciplinary tools can thus make it more costly for banks to take risk. Banking reform proposals 
that encourage the provision of private efforts2 in monitoring and controlling bank risk are 
therefore considered to be more effective than direct regulatory oversight (Goyal, 2005).  
The Basel Committee on banking supervision emphasizes market discipline as one of the 
three pillars of bank regulation. Pillar 3 recognizes that market discipline has the potential to 
reinforce minimum capital standards (Pillar 1) as well as the supervisory review process (Pillar 2), 
and hence to promote the safety and soundness of banks.  
Deposit insurance matters in this context, in that if deposits are not completely insured, 
depositors may demand higher returns for higher risk, since higher risk-taking increases the 
likelihood of financial distress. Thus, we can hypothesize that, if uninsured depositors impose 
market discipline, bank funding costs should be reduced, with a positive influence in turn on 
bank charter value. In effect, stronger market discipline for such banks can be of benefit in terms 
of avoiding loss of charter value.  
                                                          
2  For example, mandated issuance of subordinated debt which provides direct discipline if subordinated debt yields are 
positively associated with risk (Goyal, 2005). 
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Our approach in this paper complements the existing literature on the determinants of 
charter value (González, 2005; Saunders and Wilson, 2001). Previous papers have analyzed the 
relationship between bank charter value and bank risk but do not provide a comprehensive 
analysis of market discipline as a key determinant of charter value. By contrast, our approach is 
to analyse the impact of market discipline on charter value, controlling for risk and general 
economic conditions, using Australian and Canadian banks as a less noisy panel dataset.  
Our study contributes to the existing banking literature in several important ways. First, 
this is one of the few studies that investigate the possibility of complex associations that might 
exist between the determinants of charter value. For example, we explore the influence of capital 
requirements on market discipline and the way this affects charter value. Another feature of this 
study is the analysis of the influence of contingent liabilities, profitability and non-traditional 
intermediation activities on market discipline in increasing bank charter value. Second, the body 
of literature on bank charter value and market discipline is limited to US and Europe, and 
practically non-existent for Australia and Canada. Finally, this study closely examines the 
corrective effect of market discipline, bank capital, and other bank-specific characteristics on 
bank charter value during the GFC period. Thus, this provides an opportunity to investigate the 
differential crisis-effect of various factors on charter value.  
We analyse individual listed banks from Australia and Canada, which account for around 
88% of Australian and 90% of Canadian banking system assets respectively. The time period, 
1995–2011 covers a period of extensive and rapid regulatory changes for both countries’ 
financial sectors.3 Our results suggest that, on average, market discipline increases bank charter 
value, although its influence varies depending on other bank characteristics (including bank 
                                                          
3 For example, for Australian banks, we observed five important financial milestones: the establishment of the Australian 
Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) in 1998; the commencement of “Financial Services Reform Act 2001” in 2002; changes 
to prudential regulation resulting from Basel II being introduced progressively from 2007; introduction of explicit deposit 
insurance scheme following the GFC 2007/2008; and the formation of Financial Stability Board (FSB) in April 2009 (as the re-
establishment of the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), which had existed since 1999). Similarly, in the past two decades, legislative 
restructuring has led to structural changes in the Canadian banking system. Since the 1992 and 1997 Bank Act amendments, the 
banks shifted towards off-balance sheet activities and fee income. Further, following the GFC, Canada announced its intention to 
fully implement Basel III requirements on all Canadian banks by 2013.  
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capital, contingent liabilities and fee income) and the GFC. Most specifically, we find that 
interbank deposits impact charter value when banks have higher bank capital. Our findings also 
indicate that depositors and creditors consider fee-based income to be risky, thus reducing bank 
charter value. Most notably, we find that sensitivity of charter value to market discipline is 
reduced in the post-GFC period. Finally, banks with higher profitability tend to benefit from 
higher charter value in the post-GFC period. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant 
literature and research focus that underlie the paper’s analysis. Section 3 presents data and 
methodology. Section 4 describes the empirical analysis while robustness checks are provided in 
Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper with some policy implications. 
2. Literature review and research focus 
2.1 Market discipline - deposit growth 
There is mixed evidence in the banking literature on depositor discipline and bank risk-
taking. Prior studies (e.g., Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2004; Martínez-Peria et al., 2001; Park 
and Peristiani, 1998) conclude that depositors punish riskier banks by withdrawing their money 
and/or demanding higher interest rates. However, when associated with deposit 
insurance/government guarantees, market discipline fails to discipline bank risk-taking 
(Demirgüc-Kunt et al., 2004). Martínez-Peria et al. (2001) thus argue that when deposit insurance 
is not credible, market discipline may exist. Further, Fonseca and González (2010) demonstrate 
that if a bank has market power in the deposit market, it may have a lower incentive to increase 
costly bank capital to reduce the cost of deposits when its risk profile increases.  
2.2 Market discipline – subordinated debt 
The market disciplinary role of subordinated debt is evident as banks move into riskier 
activities. It has been argued that subordinated debt directly affects bank risk from the higher 
funding costs that riskier banks face, through derived discipline, and finally from the tax benefits 
of debt (Evanoff and Wall, 2002). These benefits include providing a signal of bank riskiness or 
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asset quality to market regulators and investors. Based on the signal, the banks can lower their 
cost of funding and/or increase their capital requirements. 
Rational subordinated debt holders require a higher premium from riskier banks as 
compensation for the higher risk they bear. This, in turn, means market prices and interest rates 
should reflect individual bank riskiness. Subordinated debt prices can have both direct and 
indirect disciplinary effects on bank behaviour (Flannery, 2001). Direct market discipline exists 
when the probability of default causes the risk premium demanded by potential subordinated 
debt holders to increase. This raises banks’ cost of funding and consequently incentivises them 
to pre-emptively limit excessive risk-taking. Indirect market discipline occurs when an increase in 
bank’s probability of default reduces the secondary market price for subordinated debt. These 
price movements signal a bank’s solvency status. Thus, regulators and market participant can use 
this information to examine bank’s activities. Indeed, banks can avoid this burden by pre-
emptively lowering risk (Flannery, 2001).  
Furthermore, Flannery and Sorescu (1996) argue that both asset quality and market 
leverage impact subordinated debt while there is little evidence of a relationship between interest 
rate risk and subordinated debt. However, these arguments should be judged with some caution 
with Calem and Rob (1999) showing that subordinated debt may have little impact on the 
portfolio allocation decision of a well-capitalized bank. Blum (2002) argues that, if a bank is 
committed to a level of risk, the presence of subordinated debt can help to reduce bank risk but, 
if the bank is not committed to a specific level of risk, the issue of subordinated debt may flag 
higher risk than under a full deposit insurance regime.  
2.3 Market discipline – interbank deposits 
There is some empirical evidence on the market disciplinary effect of uninsured deposits 
including subordinate debt and interbank deposits4. For example, Nier and Baumann (2006) find 
that subordinated debt investors in European and US banking, excluding government owned or 
                                                          
4 Interbank deposits involve unsecured lending between financial institutions. Typically, these deposits are not covered by an 
explicit deposit insurance scheme. It is often argued that banks are likely to be informed investors in the inter-bank market. 
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guaranteed institutions, are sensitive to bank risk. Nier et al. (2006) use a number of market 
discipline variables including uninsured liabilities. Their study finds that uninsured liabilities are 
positively related to bank capital ratios, creating an incentive for banks to limit their risk of 
insolvency by choosing a higher capital buffer for a given level of risk.  
Further, Rochet et al. (1996) support the idea that regulators can use market signals to 
identify banks that the market perceives as risky. They argue that interbank exposures can 
contribute to prudent market behavior and reduce the probability of bank failure and systemic 
distress. This can be achieved by creating incentives for lending banks to monitor interbank 
borrowing banks. In essence, lending banks perform a complementary task to bank regulators 
and supervisors (Dinger and Von Hagen, 2009). However, in an environment where interbank 
borrowers are large, this disciplining role of interbank borrowing may be hindered by “too-big–
to-fail” concerns, since interbank lenders may anticipate potential bail-outs of large interbank 
borrowers (Rochet et al., 1996). This concern led to a number of studies (e.g., Distinguin, 
Kouassi and Tarazi, 2012; Dinger et al., 2009) investigating small (borrowing) institutions and 
countries (in particular, Central and Eastern Europe) with long-term interbank lending (as 
opposed to short-term/overnight loans observed in developed markets such as the USA). The 
findings confirm that interbank borrowing is associated with substantially lower risk-taking by 
borrowing banks and is thus consistent with monitoring performed by the lending banks. 
2.4 Bank capital 
The relationship between bank charter value and bank capital has been discussed 
extensively (Keeley, 1990). This association can be explained by a moral hazard effect and a 
market rent effect (Allen and Rai, 1996). It is well-known that government guarantees or safety 
nets (such as deposit insurance, too-big-to-fail guarantees, and lender of last resort) can lead to a 
moral hazard problem. If the value of guarantees to the bank is less than they are charged for 
them, the safety net provides banks with a net subsidy (Allen et al., 1996), which is incorporated 
within the bank’s charter value. Thus, the moral hazard effect explains that, if bank charter value 
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stems from government subsidies, this may discourage banks from holding capital. As these 
subsidies become more generous, bank capital is substituted by a government safety net and a 
negative association emerges between charter value and bank capital.  
The market rent effect, however, reflects a positive association between bank capital and 
charter value. To avoid any additional costs from providing a subsidy, governments impose 
restrictions on entry to banking. Entry restrictions allow banks to earn monopoly rents that may 
be dependent on the terms of the safety nets. Imperfectly competitive financial markets can also 
allow banks to earn monopoly rents and thus, higher charter value. Bank failure can force the 
shareholders to surrender the bank’s charter value or expected profits from continued 
operations. Therefore, banks’ expected future profitability leads to higher charter values which, 
in turn, reflect greater capital buffer which may be significant for shareholders to retain control 
and reduce the probability of default. In our sample banks we find that banks maintain a much 
higher capital buffer than the regulatory requirement of the Basel Accords I and II. We are also 
cognizant of evidence from the GFC that Australian and Canadian banks appear to have pursued 
safer policies, thus preserving financial stability. 
Bank regulators’ use of capital regulation to control bank risk can bring the desired 
outcome if supplemented by other supervisory tools such as market discipline (via subordinated 
debt). Herring (2004) argues risk-weights fail to reflect risk accurately, encouraging banks to 
implement procedures that do not account for portfolio diversification, and Basel II imposes 
heavy compliance costs and makes it hard to monitor the enforcement of capital requirements. 
Market discipline via subordinated debt can enhance the effectiveness of capital regulation at a 
much lower cost. For example, market discipline discourages regulatory arbitrage because 
subordinated debt holders are more concerned about the bank’s overall exposure to the risk of 
insolvency than the regulatory risk weights. In addition, banks can benefit from quantifying and 
controlling their overall exposure to risk. Thus, market discipline can complement the functions 
of bank capital. From a banker’s viewpoint, issuing subordinated debt may substitute 
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conveniently for direct recapitalization through equity issues, which can entail substantial agency 
costs under information asymmetry (Myers and Majluf, 1984) and can increase the probability of 
failure (Ashcraft, 2008).  
2.5 Other variables of interest 
The other variables of interest in our analysis include revenue diversification, contingent 
liabilities and profitability5. Several studies (Tan and Floros, 2013, Lepetit, Nys, Rous and Tarazi, 
2008; Stiroh and Rumble, 2006) suggest that banks' expansion into non-traditional financial 
activities is not associated with diversification benefits, but rather with lower risk-adjusted return 
(or charter value) and higher insolvency risk. However, Baele, De Jonghe and Vennet (2007) 
provide evidence that the market judges more diversified banks to have a higher return potential 
(measured by Tobin’s Q). Williams (2012) finds evidence in the Australian context that 
combining interest with non-interest revenues does not generate any portfolio diversification 
benefit, supporting the argument that greater complexity can lead to an increase in agency costs 
that may exceed any diversification benefits (Schmid and Walter, 2009; Laeven and Levine, 
2007).  
Contingent liabilities can help banks to earn rents temporarily if they have superior 
production technology that may not be available to other institutions, the so-called first-mover 
effect (Furlong and Kwan, 2006). Banks may have scope economies with other bank activities 
giving them a cost-advantage over non-bank institutions because banks have a comparative 
advantage in off-balance sheet activities like loan commitments (Haq and Heaney, 2012). Hence, 
the combination of scope economies and potential efficiency enhancement can contribute to 
improve banks' charter value (Furlong et al., 2006).  
In summary, our paper extends earlier studies in several directions. First, we consider 
that uninsured liabilities such as subordinated debt and interbank deposits are effective in 
                                                          
5 Contingent liabilities include the bank guarantees attached to commercial letters of credit, loan commitments and stand-by 
letters of credit. It helps banks, particularly in times of increased competition, to expand their revenue sources without altering 
their capital structure. 
10 
 
providing incentives for banks to limit their risk-taking and maintain a higher charter value. 
Indeed, we argue that as the bank's risk profile increases the depositors will demand higher 
returns, so that banks will have an incentive to maintain higher bank capital which, in turn, will 
increase bank charter value. Second, regulators have tried to counter-balance incentives by giving 
capital adequacy a more prominent role in the prudential regulatory process.6 Thus, it is crucial to 
ascertain the relation between bank charter value and subordinated debt to understand whether 
subordinated debt can be treated as a substitute for bank capital. Third, in our analysis we predict 
that revenue diversification increases bank charter value. This is a plausible prediction since our 
sample countries have, on average, less volatile non-interest income, unlike their peers such as 
US banks where diversification effects may be dominated by volatility effects (Reserve Bank of 
Australia, 2012, Stiroh, 2006). Finally, we explicitly explore the impact of the determinants of 
bank charter value in the presence of market discipline and during 2007/2008 crisis.  
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
The dataset is of listed banks in Australia and Canada. Bank level information, including 
the balance sheet and income statement are extracted from both Bankscope and Osiris 
databases. Market information including market value of equity is collected from Datastream 
International. The sample involves all publicly listed banks observed over 1995 to 2011, giving 
an unbalanced panel of 282 bank-year observations. Following recent mergers, the four largest 
Australian banks account for around 88% of the Australian banking system assets while the six 
largest Canadian banks account for around 90% of the Canadian banking system assets. The list 
of banks is shown in Table 1 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
                                                          
6 For instance, Tier 1 capital requirements, which include common equity and other qualifying financial instruments based on 
stricter criteria, will increase from 4% to 6% in Basel III. 
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3.2 Dependent variable 
The dependent variable, bank charter value, can be measured by Tobin’s Q, defined as the 
ratio of the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of liabilities to the book value 
of total assets (Keeley, 1990). Charter value reflects market capitalization, and thus the current 
and future business environment that a bank operates in. 
tj,i,
tj,i,tj,i,
ti.j,
Assets of Book value
sLiabilitie of Book value  Equity of ueMarket val
 lueCharter va

    (1) 
with subscripts i, j,t represents an individual bank i in country j at time t (i.e. 1995-2011).  
An alternative proxy for bank charter value is the ratio of demand deposits to total deposits 
(Goyal, 2005).  
tj,i,
tj,i,
tj,i,
depositsTotal 
deposits Demand
 ratiodeposit  Demand        (2) 
The subscripts i, j,t represents an individual bank i in country j at time t (i.e. 1995-2011). This 
ratio is a measure of market power in the deposit market. Keeley (1990) argues that a bank’s 
ability to issue deposits below the market rate is an important component of bank charter value. 
Consistent with this argument, Neumark and Sharpe (1992) raise two concerns: first, banks with 
market power are slow to adjust their deposit rates upward in response to rising open market 
rates; and second, those same banks adjust their deposit rates downward in response to falling 
market interest rates more rapidly.Hutchinson and Pennacchi (1996) show that many banks 
exercise their market power in setting retail deposit rates, with demand deposits contributing 
significantly to a bank’s charter value. We therefore use the demand deposits ratio as an alternate 
proxy for charter value.  
3.3 Explanatory variables 
This study explores market discipline as a potential determinant of bank charter value. As 
discussed in Section 2, we propose alternative proxies for market discipline including deposit 
growth, subordinated debt, and interbank deposits. Deposit growth is the ratio of change in deposit and 
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short term funding to the gross domestic product (GDP) deflator (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2004). 
Subordinated debt is measured by total subordinated debt to total liabilities, and finally, 
interbank deposit is the ratio of total interbank deposits to total liabilities (Nier et al., 2006).  
Bank capital (Tier 1) is measured by common equity relative to risk-adjusted assets. 
Contingent liabilities (CL) are measured by total off-balance sheet items against total liabilities. 
Off-balance sheet items or contingent liabilities include managed securitized assets, guarantees, 
acceptances and documentary credits, and committed credit lines and other contingent liabilities. 
Revenue diversity is captured by non-interest income (NII), calculated as net fees and 
commission against total operating income for individual banks. Bank profitability is measured 
by the return on average equity (ROAE). Finally, we incorporate bank size (SZ) and bank size 
squared (SZ2) (natural logarithm of total asset) to capture any effects of size differences among 
the sample banks.  
A number of additional country-level factors could also be important to bank charter 
value such as the degree of bank concentration and real GDP growth rate (RGDP). Bank 
concentration ratio (BKCON) is included to control for cross-country variation in the structure 
of the banking sector (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2010). Bank concentration can show a 
positive or a negative relationship with bank risk, depending on the intensity of bank 
competition. Theoretically, from a bank risk perspective, higher competition may have a harmful 
impact on financial system stability (“too big to fail” problem) if it leads to erosion of charter 
value and encourages greater risk (Boyd, De Nicoló and Al Jalal, 2006). In contrast, Beck, 
Demirguc Kunt and Levine (2006) find that a more concentrated banking system is subject to a 
lower probability of systemic risk and is thus more stable.  
We follow Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2004) and incorporate real GDP growth (RGDP) as the 
macro-economic control variable. This will capture the impact of macro-economic shocks that 
adversely affect bank performance by increasing risk. We predict the relationship to be positive 
13 
 
with charter value. Finally, we include crisis dummy (Crisis) which equals 1 for period 2008-2011 
and 0 otherwise. Table 2 below summarizes our dependent and explanatory variables. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
3.4 Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis  
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for bank characteristics and macro-economic 
variables. Keeley’s measure of charter value has a mean of 1.03, while Goyal’s measure of charter 
value has a mean of 0.538. We observe that Australian banks have maintained higher charter 
values compared to their Canadian counterparts, with a peak observed after 1997.7 The Wallis 
Inquiry, which reported in 1997, may have created an appropriate balance between achieving 
competitive outcomes and ensuring financial safety and market integrity (Wallis, Beerworth, 
Carmichael, Harper and Nicholls, 1997).  
The alternative measures of market discipline, that is, deposit growth, subordinated debt, and 
interbank deposit ratios have mean values of 0.001, 1.116, and 0.045 respectively. The Australian 
banking system has a wholesale funding (includes interbank deposits) ratio of 34%, higher than 
for the Canadian system at 23% (Reserve Bank of Australia, 2012). We use interbank lending 
because interbank markets are not the same because of differences in central bank procedures 
and overnight cash markets. A higher wholesale ratio does not necessarily indicate higher 
funding risk since the maturity and diversity of wholesale funding may differ, with some 
wholesale funding, for example, being long-term.  
In addition, our data suggests that interbank deposits relative to total liabilities slumped 
to a low of 3% in 2011 for Australia. We can also observe that Australian banks’ dependence on 
inter-bank borrowing is greater than their dependence on the subordinated debt market. Further, 
Australian banks are more active in the subordinated debt market compared to their Canadian 
counterparts. However, the outstanding amount of Australian banks’ subordinated debt has 
                                                          
7 Source: Authors’ own calculation.  
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fallen around $10 billion since September 2008, after strong issuance in the earlier part of the 
decade. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
In general, banks hold Tier 1 ratio well above the minimum capital requirement of 4%. 
For example, the maximum Tier 1 ratio 14.7% is observed for Canadian Imperial Bank of 
Commerce, while the minimum of 6.1% is observed for Bendigo and Adelaide Bank. Regarding 
size, as of 2011, the smallest bank in the study is Canadian Western Bank with total assets of 
USD 14,913.23 million, whereas the largest bank, Royal Bank of Canada has total assets of USD 
797,261.20 million.  
The macroeconomic variable real GDP growth rate (RGDP) reflects both crisis and 
normal periods, and thus the minimum and maximum values capture volatility. Data indicate that 
in 2009, Canadian GDP growth was -2.77% while Australian GDP growth was 1.37%. The 
market structure variable bank concentration ratio shows that the share of the top three banks in 
the industry ranged from 37% to 77%, with a mean value of 53% indicating that Australian and 
Canadian banks operate in a concentrated and competitive market.  
Pearson correlation coefficients are reported in Table 4. The correlation between deposit 
growth and bank charter value is 0.11 and statistically significant at the 5% level. This indicates 
market discipline is positively linked to bank charter value. The correlation between size and 
charter value (Keeley’s measure) is 0.26 and statistically significant. Other bank-specific variables 
are also significantly correlated with charter value including profitability ratio (ROAE) (0.45), and 
off-balance sheet activities (OBS) (0.34). To ensure that correlations will not lead to multi-
collinearity, we check the variance inflation factors (VIF). All VIF values were less than 10, with 
the means lying between 2 and 4, suggesting that multi-collinearity is not a serious problem 
(Gujrati, 2003).  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
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3.5 Empirical method 
To examine the impact of market discipline on bank charter value, we estimate the 
following panel data model applying both individual bank and time fixed effects: 







tj,i,t1tj,2tj,1
tj,i,
2
7tj,i,6tj,i,5tj,i,4tj,i,3tj,i,2,,10
tj,i,
CrisisδGDPGrγBKCONγ
SizeβSizeβNIIβROAEβOBSβ 1Tier βMDβα
CV
 ti
tji  (3) 
In addition, to examine how the association between market discipline and charter value 
is conditional on the strength of a bank’s capital regulation, and contingent liabilities, we estimate 
the following specification: 







tj,i,tj,i,tj,i,3tj,i,tj,i,2t1tj,2
tj,1tj,i,
2
7tj,i,6tj,i,5tj,i,4tj,i,3tj,i,2tj,i,10
tj,i,
εOBSMDδTier1MDδCrisisδGDPGrγ
BKCONγSizeβSizeβNIIβROAEβOBSβ 1Tier βMDβα
CV
ti 
(4) 
Equation (5) explores the association between market discipline and charter value 
conditional on a bank’s ability to generate fee income and profitability.  




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
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(5) 
We also develop two more models (equations 6 and 7) which consider crisis as the time 
dummy variable in investigating the impact of bank regulation and market discipline (equation 6) 
and bank performance (equation 7) on charter value during the GFC.  







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2
10tj,i,9tj,i,5tj,i,4-tj,i,3tj,i,2tj,i,10
tj,i,
εTier1CrisisδMDCrisisδCrisisδGDPGrγBKCONγ
SizeβSizeβNIIβOBSβROAEβ 1Tier βMDβα
CV
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 (6) 





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εNIICrisisδOBSCrisisδROAECrisisδCrisisδGDPGrγ
BKCONγSizeβSizeβNIIβOBSβROAEβ 1Tier βMDβα
V
ti 
C
(7) 
where: i for individual banks (i = 1, 2, , 16); j for country (j = 1, 2), t for time period (t = 1995, 
1997, ….., 2011); i  is the individual fixed effects, t is the time fixed-effects, and ε is the 
remaining disturbance term. Table 2 provides detailed definitions of the dependent and 
explanatory variables. 
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4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Main results 
Table 5 reports the results of equation (3). These show that the coefficient on deposit 
growth across alternative measure of charter value is positive and statistically significant at the 
5% level or better (see columns 1, 4). This result is consistent with the argument that depositors 
discipline banks when faced with greater risk-taking.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
With regards to the subordinated debt variable (see columns 2, 5) in Table 5, we find that a 
larger proportion of subordinated debt is associated with larger charter value, consistent with the 
disciplining role of the subordinated debt. This finding is not only statistically but also 
economically significant. For instance, an increase in subordinated debt by one standard 
deviation would increase bank charter value by approximately 9%. The finding suggests that a 
larger share of uninsured funding influences banks to take less risk and, in turn, increase intrinsic 
value. This further supports the argument that, the larger the amount of uninsured funding, the 
greater the probability that market discipline will have a greater cost impact (Nier et al., 2006; 
Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes, 2006). Finally, we do not find a significant relationship between 
interbank deposits and charter value (see columns 3 and 6). One possible explanation can be that 
our sample banks did not face the same liquidity crisis experienced elsewhere during 2007/2008. 
With regard to Australian banks, inter-bank liquidity tightened significantly with all banks 
increasing their holding of Exchange Settlements Account at the Reserve Bank (Reserve Bank of 
Australia, 2012). Australian banks have lower interbank deposits compared to their Europe and 
USA counterparts. However, Australian banks are heavily involved in long-term wholesale 
funding and are required to hold more liquid assets including government debt to deal with 
liquidity (Reserve Bank of Australia, 2012).  
For each of the reported specifications in columns 1-3, we find that higher bank capital 
translates into higher charter value. As can be seen from Table 5, the coefficient of Tier 1 ratio is 
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positive and statistically significant with alternative market discipline measures indicating the 
presence of the market rent effect. Thus, if bank charter value arises from market power, then 
banks will hold higher levels of capital to preserve their access to monopoly rents (Allen et al., 
1996). To gain some sense of the economic relevance of the coefficients, we note that an 
increase in bank capital by one standard deviation would increase bank charter value by 
approximately 6%. Yet, we do not find any appreciable evidence when we apply Goyal’s (2005) 
measure of bank charter value (see, columns 4-6). Therefore, the findings further confirm that a 
market-based measure of charter value may be important to regulators and supervisors because it 
infers the true condition of a bank; this measure can thus, influence regulators to act sooner and 
avoid costly delay (Flannery 2001). 
In addition, we find a positive and statistically significant (at the 5% level) association 
between contingent liabilities and charter value, suggesting that contingent liabilities increase 
bank charter value for Australian and Canadian banks and these liabilities may not be as risky as 
perceived. One explanation could be that our sample banks are only moderately involved in 
contingent liabilities. For example, APRA limits banks’ holdings of securitized assets to a 
maximum of 25% of their loan portfolio. Further, APRA enhances the Basel II framework by 
including higher risk weights for securitization exposures to better reflect the risk inherent in 
these products, requirements in relation to valuation practices, and the capture of off-balance 
sheet and securitization activities, and increased disclosure requirements for securitizations and 
off-balance sheet exposures. This finding is not only statistically significant but also economically 
significant. An increase in contingent liabilities by one standard deviation would increase bank 
charter value by approximately 5% (see column 3).  
Across all market discipline proxies, with Keeley’s (1990) measure of charter value, the 
coefficient on fee income is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level or better, 
indicating that the market judges more diversified banks to have a higher return potential (Baele 
et al., 2007). This means that banks benefit from revenue-based diversification. An increase in 
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fee income by one standard deviation would increase bank charter value by approximately 10% 
(see column 3). Even though this finding is contrary to Mercieca, Schaeck and Wolfe (2007) on 
European banks and Stiroh et al. (2006) on US banks, their studies focus on accounting 
measures of performance. Hence, one possible explanation for the difference may be due to the 
scope of the sample. The Australian and Canadian banking landscapes differ from the US, whose 
banks have expanded into activities such as insurance. In addition, Australian and Canadian 
financial supervisors have a longer tradition of cooperation across different functional areas, 
which may have eliminated agency costs for the institution as well as the customers. 
Consequently, in these two countries, investors appear to base their valuation on the potential 
income of non-traditional revenue sources.  
Finally, the greater the return on average equity, the higher the level of bank charter 
value, suggesting that more profitable banks will find it easier to raise equity through retained 
earnings; similarly, less profitable banks face the cost of issuing equity that may lead to a lower 
bank charter value than their peers. The finding is consistent with the work of Fonseca et al. 
(2010) and Nier et al. (2006).  
With regard to the country-level variables, with Keeley’s (1990) charter value measure we 
find that the coefficient of real GDP growth rate is negative and statistically significant (see 
columns 1-3). Since, the economic conditions can affect both the numerator (equity) and the 
denominator (assets) our findings suggest that charter value may be counter-cyclical, similar to 
capital buffer (Ayuso, Pérez, and Saurina, 2004). In contrast, using Goyal’s (2005) measure, we 
find a positive and statistically significant association between a bank’s intrinsic value and GDP 
growth (see columns 4-6). This finding is consistent with the argument that banks operating in a 
country with a higher rate of GDP growth extract greater rents from market power in deposit 
markets (De Jonghe and Vennet, 2008). The coefficients of crisis dummy are negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating that, on average, bank charter value declined 
after the GFC.  
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4.2 Intermediating effect of market discipline 
We also analyse the impact of bank capital, and contingent liabilities on bank charter 
value, in the presence of market discipline. We report the results of equation 4 in Table 6. First, 
we focus on the influence of Tier 1 capital on bank charter value in the presence of market 
discipline. Our findings show that (with Keeley’s measure) the coefficient of interaction between 
Tier 1 and interbank deposits is positive and statistically significant at a 5% level. This suggests 
that interbank deposits impact charter value when banks have higher bank capital. However, we 
do not find any appreciable evidence when we use deposit growth and subordinated debt as a 
proxy for market discipline (see columns 1, 2) with both charter value measures.  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
With regard to Keeley’s measure, the positive and statistically significant coefficient with 
alternative measures of market discipline suggest that market discipline impacts on charter value 
more strongly when banks have more contingent liabilities (see columns 1, 2). However, with 
regard to Goyal’s measure of charter value the positive and statistically significant coefficients of 
contingent liabilities × deposit growth (see column 4) and contingent liabilities × interbank deposits (see column 
6), suggest that contingent liabilities increase bank charter value in the presence of market 
discipline. 
In addition, we report the results of equation 5 in Table 7. The positive coefficient on 
ROAE × market discipline (see columns 1-6), confirms that the impact of return on average equity on 
bank charter value is more pronounced, in presence of market discipline. Thus, more profitable 
banks attract more uninsured deposits, increasing bank charter value.  
Finally, the coefficient on non-interest income × market discipline (i.e., deposit growth, 
subordinated debt and interbank deposits) is negative and statistically significant at a 5% level or 
better (see columns 1, 2, 5, 6). The finding suggests that depositors and creditors consider fee-based 
income to be risky, which reduces bank charter value. Further, our result supports the argument 
that non-interest income provides banks with limited diversification (Stiroh, 2006). However, 
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Lepetit et al. (2008) argue that fee-based income (and not trading income) and risk are positively 
correlated when they analyse European banks. Diagrammatic presentation of the result is 
reported in Appendix 1.  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
4.3 Impact of GFC 
It is possible that the effect of market discipline on bank charter value may have changed 
with the GFC. We investigate whether, during the GFC, bank regulation and market discipline 
played a greater or lesser role in maintaining banks’ charter value. To examine the impact of the 
crisis on the extent of charter value, we interact regulatory variables and market discipline 
variables with the crisis dummy (dummy=1 for years 2008-2011 and dummy= 0 otherwise). 
Regression results are reported in Table 8.  
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
We begin by examining whether market discipline affects charter value during the 
2007/2008 crisis period. The coefficient of the interaction term between deposit growth and the 
crisis dummy variable is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level (see column 1). 
Similarly, we observe negative coefficient on the interaction terms crisis × market discipline (see 
columns 1-5). These findings suggest a reduced sensitivity of bank charter value to market 
discipline during the crisis period. This negative association indicates that depositors and 
creditors may anticipate government protection during the crisis period and hence have no 
incentive to monitor banks.  
We also find that, during the crisis period, bank capital (i.e.; crisis × Tier 1) is negatively 
associated with charter value. Our result holds across all model specifications (see columns 1-6). 
This finding is consistent with the moral hazard effect (Allen et al., 1996) that stems from 
generous governmental safety nets. Prior to the GFC, Australian banks were not explicitly 
government-backed and taxpayers had never guaranteed bank deposits nor had they ever 
guaranteed institutional debt. Accordingly, these safety nets can act as a substitute for bank 
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capital and lead to a further reduction in bank capital levels as governmental subsidies become 
more generous.  
Next, we analyze the importance of non-interest income, contingent liabilities, 
profitability, and bank intrinsic value during the crisis period. We interact each of the variables 
including fee income, contingent liabilities and return on average equity (ROAE) with the crisis 
dummy. The regression results are reported in Table 9.  
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
The coefficient of the interaction term between non-interest income and crisis dummy 
variable is negative and statistically significant at a 5% level in all model specifications (see columns 
1-6). This result suggests that, in the post-crisis period, fee income tends to reduce bank charter 
value. We may infer from this that banks have probably reverted to more traditional business 
models after the crisis. In addition, we find that the coefficient of return on average equity is 
positive and statistically significant during the crisis period (see columns 1-3). Thus, banks with 
higher profitability tend to increase bank charter value (Keeley’s measure) in the post-crisis 
period. One possible explanation is that our sample banks continued to report solid profits 
throughout the financial turmoil. A number of interrelated factors have contributed to the 
relatively strong performance of the Australian and Canadian banks. For instance, both banking 
systems have limited direct exposure to types of securities including securitization, which led to 
massive losses for counterparts in other countries. Further, our sample banks heavily rely on 
domestic loans, particularly the low-risk household sector. Therefore, better lending standards 
and a proactive approach to prudential supervision may have contributed to this outcome. 
Diagrammatic presentation of the result is reported in Appendix 2.  
5. Robustness checks 
We conduct several robustness checks. First, we test for possible confounding effects. 
This means re-estimating the models using dummy variables to adjust for some critical events 
that have occurred during our study period, such as the Asian financial crisis of 1997, the 
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Russian debt (rouble) crisis of 1998 and the internet bubble in 2000. Our main results are 
qualitatively insensitive to different events periods.  
We re-run equations (4) and (5) including the crisis dummy and the interaction terms 
between bank-specific characteristics. Again, even though our main results continue to hold, we 
find that bank capital is negatively associated with charter value in the presence of market 
discipline (in particular deposit growth), suggesting some evidence of moral hazard during the 
Asian crisis of 1997 and the Russian debt crisis of 1998. We do not find any significant results 
with regard to the interaction term non-interest income × market discipline. However, we find 
that non-interest income appears to increase bank charter value, even in the presence of market 
discipline during the Asian financial crisis of 1997.  
Next we re-run equations (6) and (7) including the interaction terms between crisis 
dummy and bank-specific characteristics. Although our main results remain unchanged, we do 
find some mixed evidence with regard to the interaction term Crisis × market discipline. During the 
Asian Crisis, and the Russian debt crisis, we find that deposit growth and charter value is 
positively associated. Further, our finding in relation to the interaction term, Crisis × ROAE, is 
negative and statistically significant at a 1% level. The coefficient on the interaction term Crisis × 
contingent liabilities shows mixed evidence suggesting that, during the 1997 Asian and the 1998 
Russian debt crises, contingent liabilities appear to increase bank charter value.  
Second, we run equations (3)–(7) for both countries separately. We find evidence that the 
coefficient on the interaction term (contingent liabilities × crisis) is positive and statistically 
significant, suggesting that contingent liabilities increase bank charter value (Keeley’s measure) in 
the post-GFC period for Australian banks. We also find that the coefficient on the interaction 
term (non-interest income × crisis) is insignificant for Canadian banks indicating that our main result 
may be driven by Australian banks.  
Third, following the work of Fiordelisi and Mare (2013), we include liquidity risk in our 
model, measured by liquid assets divided by deposits and short-term funding. Banks with a large 
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volume of liquid assets are perceived to be safer because these assets would allow the banks to 
meet unexpected withdrawals. We expect more liquid banks to show a higher bank charter value. 
Our findings demonstrate that the main results reported are not sensitive to the inclusion of 
liquidity risk. Finally, we apply an alternative measure of bank charter value that is market value 
of equity to book value of equity. The results remain unchanged from those reported in Tables 
5–9 and discussed earlier in Section 4, and so are not reported separately here.8 
6. Conclusion 
The GFC has generated renewed interest into both market discipline and bank charter 
value. Regulators have repeatedly concentrated on strengthening Pillar 3 or market discipline for 
banks in controlling excessive risk-taking. Charter value has also gained the interest of the 
regulators in so far as it can work as a self-disciplinary tool in reducing the moral hazard problem 
that arises from implicit and explicit deposit insurance schemes. However, it is evident that bank 
charter values in Australia, Canada, Europe and USA show a declining trend and contribute to 
the increase in risk-taking that led to the sub-prime financial crisis. In view of its importance, and 
given the role that market discipline plays in the modern banking system, it is surprising how 
little research has dealt with the effect of market discipline on bank charter value, particularly on 
Australian and Canadian banks, two of the world’s safest banking systems. Against this backdrop, 
our paper investigates the impact of market discipline on bank charter value. To this end, 
evidence is sought as to how this relationship is conditional on the strength of a bank’s capital 
regulation, contingent liabilities, and non-interest income. Similarly, evidence is also sought on 
the effect of bank regulation and other bank characteristics during the GFC.  
Using a sample of all publicly traded domestic banks in Australia and Canada over the 
1995 to 2011 period, our results suggest that, on average, market discipline increases bank 
charter value, although the influence of market discipline varies depending on other bank-
specific characteristics including bank capital, contingent liabilities and fee income, as well as the 
                                                          
8 For the sake of brevity the results are not reported separately, however, further details on robustness tests are available upon 
request.  
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GFC. Most specifically, we find that interbank deposits impact charter value when banks have 
higher bank capital. Our results also suggest that depositors and creditors consider fee-based 
income to be risky, reducing bank charter value. Most notably, we find that sensitivity of charter 
value to market discipline is reduced in the post-GFC period. Finally, banks with higher 
profitability tend to increase bank charter value in the post-GFC period.  
Our findings yield some policy implications for regulators and policymakers. First, the 
findings of this study may help regulators and policy makers to a gain a better understanding of 
charter value in offsetting the effects of moral hazard problem in the financial system. Second, in 
many jurisdictions, the banking system has become more concentrated particularly, since the 
onset of the GFC and hence, the disciplining power of banks’ charter values may have changed, 
affecting banks’ risk taking incentives. Thus, understanding the determinants of charter value has 
implications for bank safety and soundness. With regards to financial reform in the post-GFC 
period, our findings suggest that market discipline, bank regulation, and less volatile non-interest 
income, may improve banks’ risk-return profile and may contribute towards a higher bank 
charter value.   
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Appendix 1 Diagrammatic presentation of moderating effects-bank-specific characteristics 
 
 
The above diagram summarises the complex association that may exist among the determinants of bank charter value (see 
equations 4 & 5). It can be observed that in the presence of market discipline, bank capital and charter value are positively 
associated. A similar association is observed between contingent liabilities and charter value. In addition, it is evident that ROAE 
and bank charter value are positively associated, in the presence of market discipline. However, non-interest income is negatively 
related with charter value, when it is interacted with market discipline. Detailed explanations of the results are reported in sub-
section 4.2.  
 
Appendix 2 Diagrammatic presentation of moderating effects-GFC crisis 2007/2008 
 
 
 
The above diagram summarises the complex association that may exist between the determinants of bank charter value and crisis 
dummy (see equations 6 & 7). It can be observed that during the crisis period, bank capital and charter value are negatively 
associated. Similar evidence is observed between market discipline and non-interest income. However, ROAE is positively 
associated with charter value, when it is interacted with crisis dummy. Detailed explanations of the results are reported in sub-
section 4.3. The result for contingent liabilities is not reported in the diagram since it is statistically insignificant across both 
measures of charter value.   
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Table 1 List of Sample Banks 
The table shows the banks based on their size (in millions of USD). The sample consists of all publicly listed and domestic banks 
in Australia and Canada. The sample covers 89% of the Australian banking sector and 91% of the Canadian banking sector. Our 
sample also includes St. George Bank, although in May 2008, it entered into merger discussions with Westpac Banking 
Corporation. In December 2008 St. George became part of the Westpac Group, contributing almost 30% of the merged entity. 
In March 2010, the Westpac Group commenced operating as a single authorised deposit-taking institution (ADI) and the legal 
entity St.George Bank Limited was de-registered. (www.stgeorge.com.au/about-stgeorge/overview/about-us/our-history).  
 
Bank name Specialisation  Total assets in 2011 (in 
millions of USD) 
Country 
Royal Bank of Canada  Commercial bank 797,261.2 Canada 
Toronto Dominion Bank Commercial bank 735,946.6 Canada 
National Australia Bank Limited Commercial bank 737,242.8 Australia 
Westpac Banking Corporation Commercial bank 655,543.8 Australia 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia Commercial bank 732,557.8 Australia 
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Commercial bank 590,975.2 Australia 
Bank of Nova Scotia  Commercial bank 596,990.1 Canada 
Bank of Montreal Commercial bank 502,736.8 Canada 
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce  Commercial bank 385,415.3 Canada 
National Bank of Canada Commercial bank 167,578.6 Canada 
Macquarie Group Ltd Bank Holding Company 159,794.1 Australia 
Suncorp Group Limited Bank Holding Company 97,892.59 Australia 
Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Limited Commercial bank 58,328.54 Australia 
Bank of Queensland Limited Commercial bank 42,656.41 Australia 
Laurentian Bank of Canada Commercial bank 29,088.28 Canada 
Canadian Western Bank Commercial bank 14,913.23 Canada 
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Table 2 Definition of selected variables 
This table shows risk measures, bank specific and country specific variables used in analysis. The dependent variables consist of 
two alternate bank charter value measures. Bank–level variables include market discipline, Tier 1 ratio, contingent liabilities, 
return on average equity, non-interest income, and size. Macro-economic variables include bank concentration ratio, real GDP 
growth. Finally, a crisis dummy is incorporated.  
Variables Definition Reference 
Dependent   
Charter value (CV) 
Sum of market value of equity and book value of liabilities 
divided by book value of total assets  
Keeley (1990) 
Charter value (CV1) Demand deposits divided by total deposits Goyal (2005) 
Bank- specific variables   
Market discipline Deposit growth(Dg)= change in deposit and short term 
funding to the gross domestic product (GDP) deflator 
Demirgüc-Kunt et al. (2004),  
 
Nier et al. (2006) Subordinated debt(Sub)= total subordinated debt to total 
liabilities 
Interbank deposits (Indep)=total interbank deposits to total 
liabilities 
Bank capital or Tier 1 ratio 
Tier 1 ratio that is common equity divided by risk- adjusted 
assets 
Berger et al. (1995) 
Contingent liabilities (CL)  Total contingent liabilities divided by total liabilities  
Profitability ratio- Return on 
average equity (ROAE) 
Net income divided by average shareholder equity Bankscope database 
Non-interest income(NIN) Net fees and commission divided by operating income
 
Stiroh (2006). 
Size (SZ) Natural logarithm of total assets   
Country level variables   
Bank Concentration ratio 
(BNKCON) 
Assets of three largest banks as a share of assets of all 
commercial banks. 
Bank Scope database. 
Authors’ own calculation. 
Real GDP growth rate (GDP) 
Gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate calculated using 
Real GDP.  
Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2004); 
www.worldbank.org 
Crisis dummy (Crisis) Dummy =1 for periods 2008-2011 and dummy =0 otherwise  
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics  
This table shows descriptive statistics for risk measures and bank specific characteristics. Results are for all publicly listed and 
domestic banks across Australia and Canada from years 1995-2011. 
Variables Mean Maximum Minimum St.dev 
Bank risk measures     
Charter value (CV)-Keeley’s measure 1.03 1.12 0.93 0.03 
Charter value (CV1)- Goyal’s measure 0.54 0.99 0.02 0.40 
Explanatory variables     
Market discipline - deposit growth(Dg) 0.001 0.012 -0.002 0.002 
Market discipline -subordinated debt (Sub) 1.12 6.85 0.12 0.91 
Market discipline –Interbank deposits (Indep) 0.04 0.33 0 0.05 
Bank capital-Tier 1 ratio (Tier1) 8.88 14.70 6.10 1.81 
Contingent liabilities (CL) 0.18 0.49 0.001 0.12 
Return on average equity (ROAE) 14.20 30.29 1.17 4.55 
Non-interest income- Net fees and commission (NIN) 0.29 0.86 0.04 0.14 
Natural log of total assets (SIZE) 9.00 11.32 4.40 1.76 
Bank concentration ratio (BNKCON) 53.25 76.76 37.11 8.80 
Real GDP growth rate (GDP)  3.12 1.29 -2.77 5.53 
Crisis dummy (Crisis) 0.25 1 0 0.43 
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Table 4: Correlation Analysis  
The table shows the Pearson correlation matrix. Bold text indicates statistically significant at the 5% level. See Table 2 for variable definitions. 
 
Variables Charter value-
Keeley 
(1990) 
Charter value- 
Goyal  
(2005) 
Deposit  
growth  
Subordinated 
debt 
Interbank 
deposits 
Tier1 
ratio 
Size Contingent 
liabilities 
ROAE Revenue 
diversification 
Bank 
concentration 
ratio 
Charter value  -0.06 1          
Deposit growth 0.11 0.09 1         
Subordinated debt 0.06 -0.03 0.09 1        
Interbank deposits 0.01 0.09 -0.08 -0.09 1       
Tier1 ratio -0.17 0.01 -0.19 -0.21 -0.20 1      
Size 0.26 -0.09 -0.19 -0.15 -0.11 -0.17 1     
Contingent liabilities 0.34 -0.30 -0.22 0.09 -0.18 0.07 0.12 1    
Return on average equity 0.45 -0.14 -0.00 -0.01 0.28 -0.04 0.05 0.19 1   
Revenue diversification 0.11 0.08 0.07 -0.05 0.06 0.14 0.03 -0.02 0.07 1  
Bank concentration ratio 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.03 -0.11 0.16 0.02 -0.01 -0.10 1 
Real GDP growth rate 0.10 0.16 0.15 0.18 0.08 -0.39 0.09 -0.01 0.10 0.08 -0.13 
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Table 5 Effect of Market Discipline on Charter Value 
The dependent variable is bank reputational rent measured by Keeley’s measure and Goyal’s measure using equations (1) and (2). 
The definitions of explanatory variables are provided in table 2. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Superscripts*, **, *** 
indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Number of observations 282. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Keeley 
(1990)  
Keeley 
(1990)  
Keeley 
(1990) 
Goyal 
(2005)  
Goyal 
(2005)  
Goyal 
(2005) 
Deposit growth 2.001*** - - 0.066*** -  
 (0.667) - - (0.022) -  
Subordinated debt - 0.085*** - - 0.071** - 
 - (0.021) - - (0.149) - 
Interbank deposits - - -0.055 - - 0.086 
 - - (0.040) - - (0.090) 
Tier 1 ratio 0.026*** 0.035*** 0.055*** 0.015 0.030 0.043 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.013) (0.023) (0.035) 
Size 0.377 0.254 0.297 0.487 0.405 0.457 
 (0.295) (0.215) (0.356) (0312) (0.279) (0.347) 
Size2 0.112 0.010 0.009 0.101 -0.070 -0.056 
 (0.087) (0.008) (0.112) (0.077) (0.056) (0.054) 
Contingent liabilities 0.045** 0.038** 0.036** 0.028*** 0.038*** 0.034*** 
 (0.020) (0.017) (0.016) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) 
Non-interest income 0.076*** 0.089*** 0.094*** 0.299** 0.192** 0.255** 
 (0.025) (0.033) (0.031) (0.145) (0.086) (0.120) 
ROAE 0.014*** 0.020** 0.017*** 0.014** 0.026** 0.019** 
 (0.004) (0.001) (0.005) (0.006) (0.013) (0.008) 
Bank concentration 0.020 0.034 0.054 0.022 0.015 0.024 
 (0.024) (0.029) (0.042) (0.017) (0.019) (0.021) 
Real GDP growth -0.011** -0.008*** -0.003*** 0.015 0.038*** 0.037*** 
 (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.013) (0.014) (0.011) 
Crisis dummy -0.065*** -0.059*** -0.068*** -0.279*** -0.363*** -0.368*** 
 (0.025) (0.021) (0.022) (0.070) (0.098) (0.100) 
Intercept 0.677*** 0.709*** 0.856*** 0.432** 1.209** 1.117** 
 (0.251) (0.263) (0.320) (0.216) (0.534) (0.523) 
Model fit:       
F-Test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.532 0.554 0.501 0.413 0.455 0.467 
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Table 6 Market Discipline and Charter Value- Intermediating Effect 
dependent variable is bank reputational rent measured by Keeley’s measure and Goyal’s measure using equations (1) and (2). The 
definitions of explanatory variables are provided in table 2. Alternative measures of market discipline are considered in the 
analysis including, deposit growth, subordinated debt and interbank deposits. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
Superscripts*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Number of observations 282. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Keeley 
(1990) 
Keeley 
(1990) 
Keeley 
(1990) 
Goyal 
(2005)  
Goyal 
(2005)  
Goyal 
(2005) 
Deposit growth 0.309** - - 0.230 - - 
 (0.139) - - (0.209) - - 
Subordinated debt - 0.056*** - - 0.022** - 
 - (0.017) - - (0.010) - 
Interbank deposits - - 0.238 - - 0.866 
 - - (0.175) - - (0.692) 
Tier 1 ratio 0.009*** 0.010** 0.006** 0.011 0.005 -0.011 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.009) (0.004) (0.008) 
Size 0.298 0.207 0.244 0.209 0.242 0.344 
 (0.242) (0.171) (0.187) (0.169) (0.167) (0.281) 
Size2 0.015 0.034 0.030 0.022 -0.069 0.023 
 (0.113) (0.024) (0.023) (0.016) (0.057) (0.017) 
Contingent liabilities 0.119** 0.232** 0.226** 0.766** 1.168** 0.655** 
 (0.056) (0.116) (0.112) (0.345) (0.519) (0.296) 
Non-interest income 0.046** 0.120** 0.156** 0.200** 0.305** 0.300** 
 (0.021) (0.051) (0.071) (0.100) (0.135) (0.138) 
Return on average equity 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.013*** 0.023** 0.028** 0.023*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.010) (0.012) (0.007) 
Tier1 × deposit growth -0.356 - - 0.876 - - 
 (1.009) - - (0.607) - - 
Tier1 × subordinated debt - -0.245 - - 1.207 - 
 - (0.180) - - (0.862)  
Tier1 × interbank deposit - - 0.391** - - 0.522 
 - - (0.173) - - (0.401) 
Contingent liabilities × deposit growth 0.987** - - 0.543** - - 
 (0.418) - - (0.243) - - 
Contingent liabilities × subordinated debt - 0.866** - - 0.300 - 
 - (0.400) - - (0.230) - 
Contingent liabilities × interbank deposit - - -0.106 - - 0.488** 
 - - (0.089) - - (0.221) 
Bank concentration -0.001 -0.033 -0.021 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.026) (0.018) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) 
Real GDP growth -0.010*** -0.017*** -0.005*** 0.049*** 0.044*** 0.039*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.017) (0.016) (0.013) 
Crisis dummy -0.040*** -0.037*** -0.034*** -0.343*** -0.366*** -0.359*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.114) (0.122) (0.128) 
Intercept 0.792*** 0.830*** 1.034*** 1.118** 1.240** 1.598*** 
 (0.253) (0.280) (0.306) (0.505) (0.604) (0.399) 
Model fit:       
F-Test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.538 0.567 0.509 0.422 0.460 0.478 
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Table 7 Risk, Profitability, Market Discipline and Charter Value-Intermediating Effect 
The dependent variable is bank reputational rent measured by Keeley’s measure and Goyal’s measure using equations (1) and (2). 
The definitions of explanatory variables are provided in Table 2. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Superscripts*, **, *** 
indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Number of observations 282. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Keeley 
(1990) 
Keeley 
(1990) 
Keeley 
(1990) 
Goyal 
(2005)  
Goyal 
(2005)  
Goyal 
(2005) 
Deposit growth 0.402** - - 0.544** - - 
 (0.180) - - (0.251) - - 
Subordinated debt - 0.608*** - - 0.208 - 
 - (0.194) - - (0.198) - 
Interbank deposits - - 0.633 - - 0.503** 
 - - (0.455) - - (0.229) 
Tier 1 ratio 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.017*** 0.049 0.037 0.018 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.043) (0.029) (0.012) 
Size 0.278 0.306 0.266 0.444 0.321 0.289 
 (0.193) (0.244) (0.212) (0.355) (0.243) (0.234) 
Size2 0.007 0.012 0.043 0.109 -0.111 0.076 
 (0.006) (0.109) (0.034) (0.088) (0.079) (0.063) 
Contingent liabilities   0.155** 0.198** 0.133** 0.478** 0.666** 0.435** 
 (0.066) (0.089) (0.057) (0.239) (0.282) (0.199) 
Non-interest income 0.035** 0.042** 0.048** -0.206 -0.305 -0.267 
 (0.015) (0.018) (0.021) (0.156) (0.219) (0.178) 
ROAE 0.011*** 0.032 0.027*** 0.033** 0.019** 0.025** 
 (0.003) (0.026) (0.007) (0.013) (0.008) (0.011) 
ROAE × deposit growth 0.396** - - 0.466** - - 
 (0.176) - - (0.207) - - 
ROAE × subordinated debt - 0.175** - - 0.043** - 
 - (0.087) - - (0.021) - 
ROAE × interbank deposit - - 0.145** - - 0.233** 
 - - (0.065) - - (0.116) 
Non-interest income × deposit growth -0.186** - - 0.333 - - 
 (0.084) - - (0.224) - - 
Non-interest income × subordinated debt - -0.765** - - -0.548** - 
 - (0.335) - - (0.228) - 
Non-interest income × interbank deposit - - 0.199 - - -0.344*** 
 - - (0.132) - - (0.105) 
Bank concentration -0.122 -0.109 -0.017 0.012 0.009 -0.002 
 (0.101) (0.087) (0.013) (0.023) (0.060) (0.003) 
Real GDP growth -0.009*** -0.014*** -0.110*** 0.098*** 0.055*** 0.044** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.037) (0.026) (0.018) (0.019) 
Crisis dummy -0.056*** -0.044*** -0.051*** -0.355*** -0.498*** -0.356*** 
 (0.020) (0.013) (0.017) (0.118) (0.166) (0.118) 
Intercept 1.340*** 1.453*** 1.287 *** 1.366** 1.578*** 1.330** 
 (0.268) (0.288) (0.367) (0.607) (0.631) (0.665) 
Model fit:       
F-test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.537 0.565 0.508 0.423 0.455 0.468 
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Table 8 Crisis, Regulation and Charter Value- Intermediating Effect 
The dependent variable is bank charter value measured by Keeley’s measure and Goyal’s measure using equations (1) and (2). 
The definitions of explanatory variables are provided in Table 2. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Superscripts*, **, *** 
indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Number of observations 282. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Keeley 
(1990) 
Keeley 
(1990) 
Keeley 
(1990) 
Goyal 
(2005) 
Goyal 
(2005)  
Goyal 
(2005) 
Deposit growth 0.799*** - - 0.775 - - 
 (0.266) - - (0.534) - - 
Subordinated debt - 0.222 - - 0.187** - 
 - (0.164) - - (0.081) - 
Interbank deposits - - -0.120 - - 0.402 
 - - (0.111) - - (1.295) 
Tier 1 ratio 0.009*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.008 0.012 0.033 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.007) (0.026) 
Size 0.233 0.267 0.344 0.355 0.387 0.298 
 (0.190) (0.213) (0.304) (0.262) (0.314) (0.335) 
Size2 0.012 0.014 0.011 0.044 -0.045 0.034 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.009) (0.034) (0.036) (0.026) 
Contingent liabilities 0.026** 0.029** 0.035** 0.687*** 0.777*** 0.458*** 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.017) (0.229) (0.258) (0.154) 
Non-interest income 0.267** 0.031** 0.051** 0.333** 0.368** 0.401** 
 (0.133) (0.015) (0.021) (0.156) (0.184) (0.178) 
Return on average equity 0.008** 0.017** 0.028** 0.030** 0.029** 0.035** 
 (0.004) (0.008) (0.019) (0.014) (0.013) (0.015) 
Crisis × deposit growth -0.477** - - -0.228* - - 
 (0.213) - - (0.123) - - 
Crisis × subordinated debt - -1.203*** - - -0.800**  
 - (0.300) - - (0.370)  
Crisis × interbank deposit - - -0.055* - - -0.166 
 - - (0.028) - - (0.145) 
Crisis × Tier1 -0.015** -0.002** -0.007** -0.016** -0.024** -0.030** 
 (0.006) (0.001) (0.003) (0.007) (0.011) (0.013) 
Bank concentration -0.004 -0.005 -0.001 0.008 0.003 0.005 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) 
Real GDP growth -0.008*** -0.010*** -0.006** 0.097*** 0.069*** 0.055*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.031) (0.019) (0.017) 
Crisis dummy -0.023** -0.026** -0.028** -0.209*** -0.222*** -0.369*** 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.069) (0.064) (0.123) 
Intercept 1.456*** 0.922*** 1.222*** 1.367*** 1.499*** 1.556*** 
 (0.364) (0.236) (0.305) (0.278) (0.299) (0.312) 
Model fit:       
F-test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.539 0.564 0.511 0.424 0.461 0.467 
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Table 9 Crisis, Bank-Specific Characteristics and Charter Value- Intermediating Effect 
The dependent variable is bank reputational rent measured by Keeley’s measure and Goyal’s measure using equations (1) and (2). 
The definitions of explanatory variables are provided in table 2. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Superscripts*, **, *** 
indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Number of observations 282. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Keeley 
(1990) 
Keeley 
(1990) 
Keeley 
(1990) 
Goyal 
(2005)  
Goyal 
(2005)  
Goyal 
(2005) 
Deposit growth 1.567*** - - 0.244 - - 
 (0.591) - - (0.165) - - 
Subordinated debt - 0.119** - - 1.998*** - 
 - (0.055) - - (0.780) - 
Interbank deposits - - -0.087 - - 0.722 
 - - (0.070) - - (0.604) 
Tier 1 ratio 0.009*** 0.005*** 0.019*** 0.033 0.036 0.045 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.027) (0.025) (0.033) 
Size 0.177 0.366 0.299 0.543 0.423 0.501 
 (0.130) (0.257) (0.257) (0.369) (0.276) (0.487) 
Size2 0.022 0.014 0.143 0.066 -0.059 0.111 
 (0.018) (0.012) (0.116) (0.050) (0.047) (0.082) 
Contingent liabilities 0.025** 0.029** 0.025** 0.876*** 0.776*** 0.823*** 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.011) (0.342) (0.224) (0.272) 
Non-interest income 0.030** 0.047** 0.054** -0.143 -0.208 -0.122 
 (0.014) (0.020) (0.022) (0.119) (0.152) (0.907) 
Return on average equity 0.006*** 0.011*** 0.018*** 0.188** 0.168** 0.233** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.085) (0.074) (0.103) 
Crisis × contingent liabilities   0.011 0.016 0.023 0.333 0.422 0.398 
 (0.022) (0.018) (0.015) (0.252) (0.439) (0.288) 
Crisis × non-interest income -0.102** -0.128** -0.199** -0.634** -0.553** -0.666** 
 (0.047) (0.057) (0.088) (0.268) (0.251) (0.289) 
Crisis × ROAE 0.009*** 0.015*** 0.017*** 0.015 0.028 0.030 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.012) (0.023) (0.025) 
Bank concentration -0.001 -0.011 -0.005 0.021 0.024 0.019 
 (0.001) (0.037) (0.004) (0.015) (0.019) (0.023) 
Real GDP growth -0.013*** -0.024*** -0.012*** 0.039*** 0.045*** 0.052*** 
 (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.010) (0.011) (0.015) 
Crisis dummy -0.112 -0.023 -0.033 -0.400*** -0.389*** -0.455*** 
 (0.086) (0.017) (0.023) (0.133) (0.077) (0.095) 
Intercept 0.933** 1.665*** 1.234** 1.743** 1.454** 1.884** 
 (0.433) (0.555) (0.546) (0.780) (0.691) (0.819) 
Model fit:       
F-test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.539 0.560 0.507 0.423 0.462 0.469 
 
